The piece evokes anti-Semitism as a threat to the Jewish community worldwide, particularly as articulated by Islamic fundamentalists, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Some liberals, he says, are faint of heart when it comes to talking about this. Greenberg (a former colleague at the New Republic in the mid-1980s) asks:  “How did liberalism—historically the philosophy of toleration and equal rights—come to be so squeamish about confronting Jew-hatred in its contemporary forms?

Here’s how:

There is a growing non-violent movement in Israel, the Palestinian territories, the United States and Europe called BDS, which stands for the boycott of, divestment from, and sanctions on the current government in Tel Aviv because it disenfranchises, demonizes, and denies the rights of about half of the human beings under its sway, solely on the basis of race and religion.

The BDS movement is liberal, in precisely the same way the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa was liberal. BDS, for example, seeks to open up the apartheid roads in Israel that are now restricted for the use of believers  of one faith only. BDS says the existence of a “Jews-only” highway is long-term folly as a security measure for Jewish people and ill-liberal on its face.

The BDS movement confronts a democratically-elected and messianically nationalistic government that daily seizes the land of people of one faith for the exclusive use of the people of another.

BDS seeks to call attention to the fact that Israel receives more U.S. taxpayer dollars than any country in the world, while its leaders barely conceal their intention to draw our nearly bankrupt government into yet another war in the Middle East in the near future.

In short, BDS is rooted in the same human desire for participatory government—the same revulsion against arbitrary power–that fuels the unexpectedly inspiring events known as the Arab Spring. Yet to declare one’s support for the BDS movement in Washington invites—no, insures– that you will indicted as an “anti-Semite” in a liberal American journal. If you are lucky, you will only be charged with the misdemeanor of being “squeamish” about Jew hatred.

That’s how it happened to me.

So excuse me, while I plead innocent to Jew-hating. Greenberg’s worries (and Ron Rosenbaum’s) about anti-Semitism seem abstracted from the reality of American politics in 2011. The most successful anti-Semite in recent U.S. presidential politics was Pat Buchanan, a charming and intelligent Irishman who undeniably has some gut animus against my Hebrew kin. He sometimes displays the same bile for my black brethren and the Latino “illegal immigrants” in my life–and for much the same reason. These dusky humanoids threaten Buchanan’s sense of the United States as a white Christian republic, which is why I  never voted for the man.

Was Buchanan over-the-top when he described the U.S. Congress as “Israel’s amen corner in Washington?” Maybe. Was the U.S. Congress over the top in giving a strutting bully named Netanyahu 29 standing ovations for during his recent Capitol Hill cameo? Definitely. We need analysis of that Zionist debacle more urgently than another sotte voce warnings about the somewhat more distant threat (at least to sane Washington discourse) of Jew hatred.

Greenberg doesn’t name any liberals who deny the reality of Jew-hatred in the Arab world, but I suppose there are a few. I don’t know or like any of them. For the sake of argument, I can agree with Paul Berman’s suggestion that the anti-Semitism of the Muslim Brotherhood somehow inspired the 9/11 hijackers and the global Islamist movement. So what? Save for pre-modern Yemen, the newly mobilized publics of the Arab world show little tolerance for or interest in the damaged and discredited leaders of what our hero Hitchens has usefully dubbed “Islamofascism.” Let’s do what we can to keep it that way.

As a taxpayer, I’m not that worked up about the strain of Jew hatred in the Muslim Brotherhood’s culture right now because my money does not fund the Egyptian Islamic party. I do pay for the regime in Tel Aviv. As a voter, I think my preferences are even-handed. In policy terms, the U.S. government has a few ways to shape the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in a more liberal direction—and it should use all of them. The U.S. government has many more levers to nudge the Israeli government in a more liberal direction—and it should use all of them.

As for the micropolitics of the Yale anti-Semitism center, Greenberg attributes the closure of the first center to some subtle, unspoken bad faith of American liberals that the administration can’t quite articulate.  Ron says it is “shameful.” As an alumnus, I agree Yale should clear the air with a concise explanation of why the first center did not meet university standards and why the second does. It’s a teachable moment.

For all his complaining, Greenberg does not address the rather more tangible role of the campus BDS movement in Yale’s decision. This multicultural movement–which naturally includes more than a few Jewish kids–made it clear to the administration of the school that an anti-Semitism center would be held to high standards of liberal discourse. It seems to me (from afar) that Yale responded to these legitimate concerns while trying to keep the boundaries of discussion as wide as possible.

Instead of addressing the arguments of the Yale BDS movement, Greenberg props up a straw man.

“Yes, yes,” he says. “Criticism of Israel isn’t necessarily anti-Semitic. Everyone agrees about that. What liberals seem to have a hard time admitting these days is that criticisms of Israel can ever be anti-Semitic. “

This liberal doesn’t have a hard time admitting that. The Jewish people have always had lots of enemies. They don’t need any more. That’s why the Muslim Brotherhood and Benjamin Netanyahu should be watched closely. But why am I getting so huffy and personal about this?

Greenberg’s essay torqued me because I am a 10^th generation white Anglo Saxon Protestant (WASP) whose formative education began when I first met Jewish people. It happened when I was enrolled in 6^th grade at the almost totally Jewish Ethical Culture school on New York’s Upper West Side. It was there, among the liberal Jews, that I contacted an apparently incurable lifelong case of the dread social disease known as “secular humanism.”

I attended Fieldston, the high-achieving high school in the Bronx that gave the world J. Robert Openheimer, the visionary physicist who warned against nuclear weapons, and Lloyd Blankfein, the Goldman Sachs visionary who got rich while my 401K evaporated, I came of age with a fatal weakness for Henny Youngman jokes and Jewish women. I eventually married one. Her father was an Ashkenazi Jew from Romania, and I was glad to have a mensch of a father-in-law. It seemed natural.

Actually I never met my father-in-law. Nesti Arene died a decade before I met my wife. But I sure love him from afar. He was darkly handsome aspiring musician who studied with Pablo Casals while still in his teens. In Nazi-occupied Paris, he lived under an assumed name to evade a national security apparatus that sought to liquidate Jews and communists. He was expelled to Argentina, and, via a romantic twist of fate, wound up bringing new levels of excellence in classical music to the people of El Salvador. Toward the end of his life, he became a refugee again. In 1980, he and his family had to leave San Salvador or be killed by a U.S.-funded national security apparatus that sought to liquidate Jews and communists. Blown across the globe by 20^th century geopolitics, my father in law never lost his sense of culture or his sense of humor. My kind of mensch.

Yet because I am a BDS supporter, I am by the current norms the nation’s capital, a borderline anti-Semite whose views have no place in respectable debates in Washington. I’m also alleged to be an enemy of academic freedom at my own alma mater. I’m “squeamish.”. Some might allow as I’m not really a Jew hater, I’m just “objectively” helping the anti-Semitic conspiracy that plans to wipe out the Jewish people in the near future. (Actually, my views on Iran are actually more complicated than that but never mind.) I hope my old friends Greenberg and Rosenbaum don’t  think I’m trafficking in age-old anti-Semitic stereotypes. I don’t think I’m a self-hating (non) Jew. But if it turns out I am, I suppose I will feel bad about it. In my own mind, I’m just a slightly evolved WASP: a Wannabe Ashkenazi Supporting Palestinians.

A common thread throughout Obama’s responses has been his belief that the U.S. image across the region is so toxic that it could undermine the change it seeks by embracing it too closely.

Prudence means deference to actors close to the scene.

“In Egypt, Obama deferred to local protesters; in Libya, he allowed France and England to drive the international debate toward military intervention—and only publicly joined them once the Arab League had signed on. By stepping back, Obama has effectively denied the region’s autocrats the opportunity to discredit indigenous demands for change as a U.S. plot.”

The downside of caution: “Delay, mixed messages, and his unilateral renunciation of the weapon of ringing rhetorical inspiration,” says Brownstein. “There’s been no Kennedyesque ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ moment for Obama.”

Which may also be a good thing. Brownstein is referring to a famous speech JFK made in Germany in June 1963 –in which he proclaimed in German, “I am a Berliner too.” As the Western half of the city resisted the Soviet Union’s efforts to impose a blockade, JFK expressed his simple human solidarity. Words worked because they spoke to a stalemate in the world’s thinking and defined an alternative, as only words could.

The democratization of the Arab world is the antithesis of mental stasis, an almost physical transformation in popular thinking about political participation whose ultimate political forms are just beginning to take shape. Eloquence from Washington at this moment might be formative. It was equally likely to be received as empty or arrogant. To the extent, Obama could wax idealistic, he would be called hypocritical. Words might be inspiring. They might be premature. They might be meaningless. Obama’s reticence is a sign of respect.

Which is not to say that presidential eloquence might not help some time soon

If and when Egypt holds elections this August, the reality of the country’s transition to democracy and its implications for peace in Israel/Palestine, will require U.S. response. Obama will have to confront the stalemate of the Israeli occupation and Palestinian resistance,  the irrelevance of  the two-state diplomatic dance, and the ugly reality of a wall of Occupation built to enforce racial and religious differences.

The opportunity for eloquence is obvious. Obama could go back to Cairo next fall or next year and say to the Israelis, a la Reagan to Soviets in 1987, “Tear this wall down.” But the White House staff will worry about the losing the Jewish base, while the National Security Council will counsel against setting expectations too high. Behind the scenes, AIPAC will sponsor Congressional resolutions to condemn the idea, duly approved by large congressional majorities, and the Obama’ 2012 reelection campaign’s fundraising goals will suffer. The Sunday morning experts will caution against pandering to the liberal base and the Arab Street. The birthers and loonier neoconservatives will say the very idea is proof the man is a closet Muslim.In short, Obama could pull a JFK or Reagan but only at the price of crossing the combined forces of the  Israel lobby and the right-wing noise machine, just in time for Election Day 2012. There seems slight chance of that.

Our chief executive seems most  likely to do like Ike: manage the status quo with mostly muted commentary.  Is that such a bad example? Eisenhower authored one of the most effective public rebukes of Israel ever to emanate from the White House. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Eisenhower declined to participate in the Anglo-French-Israeli effort to snatch the Suez Canal from Egypt’s nationalist president Gamal Nasser. Such a nakedly colonialist venture did not deserve U.S. support, and it failed. Eisenhower did not make a speech. He waited for everybody to exhaust themselves and then he made a decision–and made it stick. Sometimes that’s better.

But Hamid implies the U.S. can work with the banned opposition group  because Egypt’s  revolution won’t really change the country’s foreign policy–which is almost certainly not true. The sound idea that the Jewish state has little to fear from a democratic Egypt does not mean that it has nothing to lose. Israel has already lost plenty.

The real concern, Hamid writes, “is whether the Brotherhood, known for its inflammatory rhetoric against Israel and the United States, would work against U.S. regional interests.” Hamid understandable wants to quell fears of another Iran circa 1979. Egypt is not the scene of a runaway religious counterrevolution, nor is it likely to become one.

But we can be sure  the Muslim Brotherhood, as a participant in a new h will work against U.S. regional interests, as they are now defined. The Brotherhood ‘s leaders and followers have never shared Washington’s Israeli-centric vision of the region, and they’re not going to start now. The Brotherhood is not, as Glen Beck believes, a band of bloodthirsty anti-Semites aching for the chance to colonize North America. Nor are they are not going to collaborate with Washington’s defense of the Zionist state in its current expansionist mode. Both the fear and the hope are American projections.

Hamid says it is “unlikely” that the Brotherhood will attempt to cancel Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, also  true. But there’s a lot more to Egypt’s role in the Middle East than a 30-year old treaty. What Hamid’s reassuring argument glosses over is that the mainstreaming of the Brotherhood into Egyptian politics is a big setback for Israel in three ways.

The Brotherhood will not support the U.S.-Israeli-Mubarak policy of collective punishment in Gaza.  Nor will any democratic government in it participates. That is going to affect Israel’s ability to maintain its siege of Gaza, a linchpin of its strategy of keeping the Palestinian population out of Israeli territory.

A democratic Egypt will demand something more productive than the dysfunctional “peace process” between the unyielding Netanhayu regime and a discredited Palestinian Authority. We can be sure the new Egyptian dispensation, whatever it is, will support Palestinians who want to shrug off an unelected government and unwanted occupation.

And the Egyptian revolution is dissolving the U.S.-Israeli-Mubarak triangle of hostility against Iran. The Brotherhood’s alliance of convenience with secularist Muhamed ElBaradei, former U.N. nuclear inspections chief who says military strikes against Iran would be “insane,” is a leading indicator of Egyptian public opinion.  The U.S.-Israeli policy toward Iran based on the implied threats will no longer enjoy Cairo’s support.

The reality is that the Eygptian revolution undermines Israel’s policy of strategic deterrence and will continue to do so.

But wishful thinking dies hard. Another thing that will not change in the new Egypt, says Hamid, is the government’s clientelist mentality.

Any new, transitional government—which will be tasked with rebuilding a battered country—will not want to harm its relationship with Washington and risk losing billions of dollars in much-needed assistance.

The democratic Egypt, in this view, will tailor its policies toward Israel for the sake of Washington’s money, just as Mubarak did. This is may be true. But it may not be. Egypt, after all, has changed.

Mondoweiss thinks  Goldberg is “panicked” by the death throes of the two-state solution. To me the piece–and its extraordinary length–illuminate that unrealistic discourse about the region that permeates the liberal Washington policy culture. Maybe its the same thing.

Goldberg and Ibish’s analysis of the root of current diplomatic impasse in the region is balanced to the point of unreality.

Some contend that the Palestinian Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank, is ineffectual or illegitimate. Some say the asymmetry of power between Israel and the Palestinians is simply too great for a genuine compromise. Some insist the conflict is driven by unabated anti-Semitic incitement on the part of the Palestinians, or by irredeemable Israeli racism.

All of these statements are individually true and only the last will offend the custodians of capital legitimacy. Yet the collective truth, that most Israelis live in peace and prosperity while all Palestinians live under a web of racially discriminatory, undemocratic laws enforced by a brutal military occupation, does not quite penetrate the gloss of the authors’ fairmindedness.

Goldberg and Ibish issue a call for what they call “joint unilateralism,” that is, independent efforts by each side to persuade the other that compromise is necessary. Their timing is not deft. The Palestine Papers document what happens when the Palestinians make unilateral concessions: the Israelis pocket them and the Palestinians wind up farther from a peace agreement than ever. Goldberg and Ibish dodge the revelations of new documents while wishing that the negotiators for the two sides shared their own good intentions. Its a happy thought that seems willfully naive under the circumstances.

Is their article a species of the alleged narcissism of liberal Zionism? I don’t think so, because I think most liberal Zionists feel more tsouris than optimism right now. In any case, the sociology of motive (not my favorite enterprise)  does not explain to me why two experienced Middle East journo-wonks would avoid current political realities so assiduously.

I think Goldberg and Ibish write this way because there is hardly any other discourse about the Middle East in Washington news rooms and policy shops. The  Washington writer who does not accept the “peace process” premise; who does not articulate a balanced assessment of the two sides; and who does not voice “cautious optimism” has practically read him or herself out of the discussion, at least as it is conducted at traditional news organizations. The independent voices of the policy blogosphere–Steve Clemons and Stephen Walt–lack the institutional power that is needed to propagate ideas and message in a media democracy.

So as the political reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes more intractable, about the only rational response–within the limited frame of the Washington policy debate–is to wish for “good news” designed to shore up faith in its increasingly dubious premises. Whistle while you pass the graveyard of the two-state solution, and all your troubles will feel better.

Note what does not seem to qualify as “good news” for Goldberg and Ibish at this moment: people power in Tunis and Cairo. They never mention the popular discontent against U.S.-backed dictatorships in the region as a factor in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Why? Because in Washington policy circles, expressions of Arab democracy are bad news: bad news for nervous Hillary Clinton; bad news for the Mubaraks seeking to extend their dynasty; bad news for Israelis worrying about their best Arab ally; and bad for the “peace process” that binds them together in ineffective diplomacy.

So let’s talk about the “good news” instead.

The de facto prime minister of Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, says that after 47 years of Occupation, the Big Guy in the Mohammadean sky woke up  and decided to scorch Israel for denying the Palestinians their rights. This reminds me of the American-based zealot who blamed Hurricane Katrina on the propensity of women to work and gay people to have fun.

I’m waiting for a well-placed source (“an aide to St. Peter,” or “sources close to the Prophet,” or at least, “a retired official familiar with God’s thinking”) to confirm this story. Otherwise, I refuse to believe it.

walled garden/wired world/who wins

People say the “walled gardens” of social media are more restrictive than the World Wide Web. But are you surprised at how ideologically agnostic Facebook is? I’m not.

Hamas’s military wing recently set up a Facebook page and which got  blocked,  prompting the group’s online allies in Turkey to complain.

But supporters of Hezollah and Hamas have a Facebook page. And so do allies of the Israeli Defense Forces.

Seems pretty open to me. And guess which group has more Friends?