….last year, there were 44 drone attacks, killing only five key Al Qaeda targets but the civilian casualties exceeded 700 Pakistanis. Passionate appeals have been made to all the visitors from the US – Congressmen, officials, military brass and others  that these attacks must stop. Pakistan is absolutely critical for US strategy in the region and its war against terror is solely dependent on Pakistanis’ cooperation. Pakistan must spell out to the Obama Administration that any more cooperation with the US would be subject to US meeting Pakistanis’ concerns.

There’s no evidence that is going to happen. From the point of view of U.S. policymakers, this isn’t a dilemma. In Washington, the answer is equally obvious, though diametrically opposed, to Pakistan’s: the battlefield advantages outweigh the political costs. In the short run, that is surely true. In the long run, it depends on ignoring Pakistani democracy.

WOS finds the feeling that Somalia is being ignored is common in the East Africa media.

But Sahel blog begs to differ:

The US conducts missile strikes there. Ethiopian forces intervene regularly. Kenya keeps a close eye on its neighbor. The AU has peacekeepers there. Eritrea supports rebel factions. And were it not for outside intervention – specifically the 2006 invasion by Ethiopia – Somalia might be in better shape today. Yes, the UN could send in 5,000 peacekeepers – but if 200,000 would be needed to establish real peace, then what would be the point of a smaller number?

The pairing now known as FARQaeda would represent a disturbing alliance because of the unexamined but equally important backflow, or two-way flow, in this illegal embrace of smuggling junctions.

But how real is the threat? wonders COHA’s Leah Chavla.

no convincing evidence has demonstrated that all or even some of the African drug trafficking agents involved in this lucrative ring are actually members or affiliates of any terrorist organization.

That’s not how the transnational drug traffickers work (for the most part).

Non-simplistic discussion on the jump.

Chavla notes an alternative explanation of the nexus of Lebanese traffickers and armed guerrilla movements. Arab drug dealers use sympathiy with Hezbollah to drum up business.

“…. some of these agents who do claim an affiliation are doing so in order to gain credibility and to obtain other fringe benefits associated with membership in a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda. Such a link would boost their reputations and thus, the volume and revenue of drug trafficking activities.”

The problem, notes Chavla, a lack of direct evidence. As Chavla carefully notes:

“..Without having intercepted one such illicit drug flight, perhaps due to a lack of adequate resources and a paucity of cooperative measures taken by law enforcement or other government officials, it becomes next to impossible to certify any claims about the participants, the cargo, and the stakes involved in the drug trafficking industry.”

She’s not saying it didn’t happen. She’s saying we don’t have enough evidence to constitute proof.

Meanwhile, Douglas Farah at Counterrorism Blog says Al-Qaeda is protecting cocaine flights in West Africa. That’s a more credible story than FARQaeda.

“… from a tactical perspective al-Balawi deceived the CIA, the Jordanian intelligence agency and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) at the same time. It is unthinkable that MIT or police intelligence were not aware of the communication between al-Balawi and Bayrak. Bayrak reveals that her husband always said that he was planning to come and build his career in Turkey. Perhaps al-Balawi put emphasis on his plan to come to Turkey to distract the CIA and Jordanian intelligence”