“The Kennedys died for a reason,” says David Talbot in Salon.com.
Do you want Obama to be like Ike? Or JFK?
Like President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s Barack Obama leads passively, says Ron Brownstein in National Journal. He seems to believe words cannot speak louder than actions.
A common thread throughout Obama’s responses has been his belief that the U.S. image across the region is so toxic that it could undermine the change it seeks by embracing it too closely.
Prudence means deference to actors close to the scene.
“In Egypt, Obama deferred to local protesters; in Libya, he allowed France and England to drive the international debate toward military intervention—and only publicly joined them once the Arab League had signed on. By stepping back, Obama has effectively denied the region’s autocrats the opportunity to discredit indigenous demands for change as a U.S. plot.”
The downside of caution: “Delay, mixed messages, and his unilateral renunciation of the weapon of ringing rhetorical inspiration,” says Brownstein. “There’s been no Kennedyesque ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ moment for Obama.”
Which may also be a good thing. Brownstein is referring to a famous speech JFK made in Germany in June 1963 –in which he proclaimed in German, “I am a Berliner too.” As the Western half of the city resisted the Soviet Union’s efforts to impose a blockade, JFK expressed his simple human solidarity. Words worked because they spoke to a stalemate in the world’s thinking and defined an alternative, as only words could.
The democratization of the Arab world is the antithesis of mental stasis, an almost physical transformation in popular thinking about political participation whose ultimate political forms are just beginning to take shape. Eloquence from Washington at this moment might be formative. It was equally likely to be received as empty or arrogant. To the extent, Obama could wax idealistic, he would be called hypocritical. Words might be inspiring. They might be premature. They might be meaningless. Obama’s reticence is a sign of respect.
Which is not to say that presidential eloquence might not help some time soon
If and when Egypt holds elections this August, the reality of the country’s transition to democracy and its implications for peace in Israel/Palestine, will require U.S. response. Obama will have to confront the stalemate of the Israeli occupation and Palestinian resistance, the irrelevance of the two-state diplomatic dance, and the ugly reality of a wall of Occupation built to enforce racial and religious differences.
The opportunity for eloquence is obvious. Obama could go back to Cairo next fall or next year and say to the Israelis, a la Reagan to Soviets in 1987, “Tear this wall down.” But the White House staff will worry about the losing the Jewish base, while the National Security Council will counsel against setting expectations too high. Behind the scenes, AIPAC will sponsor Congressional resolutions to condemn the idea, duly approved by large congressional majorities, and the Obama’ 2012 reelection campaign’s fundraising goals will suffer. The Sunday morning experts will caution against pandering to the liberal base and the Arab Street. The birthers and loonier neoconservatives will say the very idea is proof the man is a closet Muslim.In short, Obama could pull a JFK or Reagan but only at the price of crossing the combined forces of the Israel lobby and the right-wing noise machine, just in time for Election Day 2012. There seems slight chance of that.
Our chief executive seems most likely to do like Ike: manage the status quo with mostly muted commentary. Is that such a bad example? Eisenhower authored one of the most effective public rebukes of Israel ever to emanate from the White House. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Eisenhower declined to participate in the Anglo-French-Israeli effort to snatch the Suez Canal from Egypt’s nationalist president Gamal Nasser. Such a nakedly colonialist venture did not deserve U.S. support, and it failed. Eisenhower did not make a speech. He waited for everybody to exhaust themselves and then he made a decision–and made it stick. Sometimes that’s better.
Update on Morley v. CIA
People keep asking me, “What’s up with the lawsuit?”
Its a hurry up and wait type of deal. Judge Richard Leon, a Bush II appointee in the U.S. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, will rule sometime this year on which, if any, of the JFK files of the deceased CIA officer George Joannides, must be made public. If you want regular updates, friend me on Facebook.
If you’re wondering, Who the hell was George Joannides and what is this story about, here’s how to find out.
I broke the story of Joannides’ curious role in the JFK story in the weekly Miami New Times back in 2001. I sued the CIA for his records in 2003. Many, if not most, of the serious JFK scholars agree with me that the CIA should comply.
If you want more detail about the Joannides investigation has evolved since, check out this video interview I did for the MaryFerrell.org, the most useful site on the Web for JFK scholars because it is more devoted to data than theories.
If you want diverse political perspectives on the Joannides story, Jacob Hornberger has applied the libertarian scapel. Blogger Machetera comes at the story from the perspective of the Latin left.
And if you are daunted by the mere idea of JFK details and polemics, you are not alone. For the K.I.S.S. version of the story, you only need to read my piece last spring in Talking Points Memo. It has an exclusive photo of Joannides getting a medal for his espionage.
One final point: If you Google “George Joannides” you will see a number of stories and blog posts linking him to the assassination of Robert Kennedy. I won’t comment on or link to these stories because they are based on a weak 2007 BBC report that proved to have no foundation in fact.
Some conspiracy theories are obvious b.s. and there’s no harm in saying so.
Is it dumb to think JFK might have been ambushed by his enemies?
Yes, says Times of London columnist David Aaronovitch in an interview with Salon.
We want to believe theories that contradict the idea that young, iconic people died senselessly. If a story takes away the accidental from their death, it gives them agency. After the JFK assassination, it was unbearable to many people that they could live in a country where a lone gunman could kill a president.
This familiar trope has a general psychological cogency–yes, we all turn to History for meaning–but, in the particular case of Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, it lacks a specific historical foundation. Aaronovitch is touting a book about conspiratorial thinking, with the appealing tag line “When smart people believe dumb things.” Yet his pitch neglects the disconcerting fact that there were plenty of smart people who concluded that Kennedy was killed by a conspiracy of his political enemies–and they did so rationally.
